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Abstract
In an attempt to capture the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate
movements, the open economy macroeconomic literature with nominal rigidi-
ties has recently concentrated on market segmentation for tradable goods or
so-called pricing-to-market models. This paper studies the implications that
such pricing structure has for the dynamics of real and nominal economic ac-
tivity within a simple open economy macroeconomic model which embodies
elements of state-dependent pricing and strategic complementarity. In contrast
to its time-dependent variants, a domestic monetary shock spills over to for-
eign consumption as movements in the distributions of price-setters in￿ uence
foreign aggregate prices.
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11 Introduction
Traditional Keynesian models of international macroeconomics assume full pass-
through of exchange rate changes to consumer prices. This assumption is central
to the expenditure-switching e⁄ect of exchange rate, the key feature giving mone-
tary policy its e¢ cacy under ￿ exible exchange rate regimes or allowing exchange rate
changes to counter country-speci￿c shocks. Yet, there is a growing body of evidence
suggesting that exchange rate changes do not fully pass-through to consumer prices.
For example, Engel (1993) and Engel and Rogers (1996) found that consumer prices
are not much a⁄ected by nominal exchange rate changes in the short-run.
In an attempt to capture the incomplete pass-through of exchange rate move-
ments, the open economy macroeconomic literature has recently concentrated on
market segmentation for tradable goods in which prices are sticky in the currency of
the consumer or so-called Pricing-to-Market (PTM) models.1 Early contributions of
PTM models have been made by Betts and Devereux (1996, 2000), Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2002), and Kollmann (2001). Unlike the traditional framework, such
models imply a radical rethinking of the expenditure-switching role of exchange rates
as domestic monetary shocks do not spill over to foreign consumption. Following
a domestic monetary shock, foreign consumers do not perceive any change in the
relative price of imports (since import prices are temporarily ￿xed in consumer cur-
rency units) and consequently do not altered their expenditure decisions. The foreign
expenditure dynamics implied by those models has lead some to argue that this be-
havior can largely insulate an economy from foreign monetary shocks (see Devereux
and Engel (2003)).
A standard but much-criticized element of this literature is an exogenously im-
posed timing of the opportunity that ￿rms have for nominal price adjustments. This
paper studies the implications of PTM for the dynamics of real and nominal economic
activity within a simple state-dependent pricing open economy macroeconomic model.
We augment our model with variable demand elasticities to induce complementarity in
price-setting. Together, state-dependent pricing and complementarity in price-setting
generate aggregate price inertia that mimic those observed in the data (see Dotsey
and King (2005)). Relative to previous PTM work, there are new implications for the
dynamics of real and nominal economic activity: in contrast to its time-dependent
variant, a domestic monetary shock spills over to foreign consumption as movements
in the distributions of price-setters in￿ uence foreign aggregate prices.
Why does the state-dependent pricing structure leads to a di⁄erent outcome
than its time-dependent variant following a domestic monetary expansion? Time-
dependent pricing models imply that the distributions of ￿rms over prices remain
constant through time while market segmentation breaks the link between domestic
1Also named Local-Currency Pricing (LCP).
2and foreign demand. These factors imply that domestic ￿rms have no incentives to
adjust prices in the foreign market since foreign aggregate prices and demand remain
constant. However, state-dependent pricing models imply that the distributions of
￿rms over prices vary with economic conditions. A domestic monetary expansion gen-
erates a currency depreciation which increases domestic ￿rms markup on exported
goods and induces ￿rms to compete in the foreign market: since ￿rms prices are
roughly set as a markup over marginal cost, ￿rms that reoptimize prices choose a
lower prices in the export market. This implies cheaper imported goods for foreign
consumer and also implies that foreign consumer can reallocate their money balance
to the consumption of domestic goods. This increase in foreign aggregate demand
raises the value of the price adjusting ￿rms and ultimately leads to higher foreign
aggregate prices. With foreign money supply held constant, this generates a foreign
consumption crash.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our open
economy macroeconomic model. Section 3 discusses the model￿ s implications using
a two-country framework calibrated to match some US facts. In this section, we
analyze the endogenous evolution of price distributions in response to an expansionary
monetary policy shock, describe the way these distributions in￿ uence international
economic activity, and contrast the implications of our model with its corresponding
time-dependent variant which is used as a reference case because of its popularity in
the current literature. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Structure of the Model
The open economy macroeconomic literature builds small scale dynamic general equi-
librium models for open economy macroeconomics and is the departure point for our
work.2 The world economy consists of two countries each having (i) a representa-
tive in￿nitely lived household, (ii) a continuum of ￿rms indexed on the unit interval,
and (iii) a monetary authority. In what follows, each variable is represented by a
country-speci￿c subscript (i.e.: 1 and 2 for Country 1 and Country 2 respectively).
When three subscripts are attached to a single variable, the ￿rst and second denote
the country of production and the country of consumption respectively, and the third
subscript denotes time.
2.1 The Households
Households are identical across countries except for the local bias introduced in con-
sumption. They demand consumption goods produced in both countries and supply
2Examples include Betts and Devereux (2000), Chari et al. (2002), Kollmann (2001), Bergin and
Feenstra (2001), and Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ (1995, 2000).
3factors of production on a competitive basis. Households in both countries maximize






t (u(ct) ￿ v (nt)) (1)
where ￿ is the subjective discount factor and u(ct;nt) is the momentary utility func-
tion with characteristics uc > 0, ucc < 0, vn > 0, and vnn > 0. These characteristics
imply that u(c) is increasing and concave, and that v(n) is increasing and convex.
Concavity of u(c) indicates diminishing marginal utility of consumption, while con-
vexity of v(n) suggests increasing marginal disutility from labor supply. More specif-
ically, our momentary utility function, separable in consumption and leisure, has the
following form, where ￿ governs the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ￿
governs the elasticity of labor supply:











We assume that households prefer to consume locally produced goods. This fea-
ture generates movements in relative prices and reinforces the terms of trade as an
important channel through which country-speci￿c output movements a⁄ect welfare:
following a decline in imported good prices, households do not fully substitute do-
mestic for imported goods in their consumption basket. Instead, households consume
a relatively ￿xed basket with a fraction (1 ￿ ￿) of domestic goods, and the remaining
￿ of foreign goods. This speci￿cation is consistent with the data since the ratios of
imports to GDP are relatively stable in the long-run. We let the (1 ￿ ￿) determines
the degree of home bias in the steady-state, and ￿ the elasticity of substitution be-



































In this context, the following equations de￿ne the optimal allocations between do-
mestic and imported consumption






























4which depend on overall consumption, domestic and imported producer price indices
(hereafter PPIs) denoted by P P, and the overall consumer price indices (hereafter
CPIs) denoted by P C.
Our benchmark economy evolves under complete domestic and international ￿nan-
cial markets. This implies that households can freely reallocate risk through a com-
plete set of state-contingent nominal bonds b and corresponding stochastic discount
factor D, such that Et[Dt+1bt+1] =
P
st+1 ￿(st+1jst)D(st+1jst)b(st+1) where ￿(st+1jst)
denotes the probability of state st+1 given st. The households also receive nominal
wages W from labor supply, and a series of dividend payments Z from ￿rms. The se-




1;tc1;t + Et[Dt+1b1;t+1] ￿ b1;t + W1;tn1;t + Z1;t (5)
P
C
2;tc2;t + Et[Dt+1b2;t+1] ￿ b2;t + W2;tn2;t + Z2;t:
We assume that prices are set in the currency of the consumer or so-called Pricing-
to-Market/Local Currency Pricing. In this environment, households choose consump-
tion, labor supply, and portfolio holdings to maximize their lifetime utility (1) subject
to a sequence of intertemporal budget constraints (5) and allocation of time. The
maximization problem implies the following risk sharing condition with the real ex-






and a constant re￿ ecting initial wealth
di⁄erences ￿:




where, S represents the nominal exchange rate de￿ned as the price of one unit of
foreign currency in terms of the domestic currency. Equation (6) implies that the
ratios of marginal utilities of consumption ￿ are equalized across countries such that
the levels of consumption de￿ned in (3) di⁄er only to the extent that the real exchange
rate deviates from its steady-state value. Finally, the level of nominal aggregate
demand is governed by a money demand relationship of the form Mt=P C
t = ct along
with country-speci￿c monetary policies.
2.2 Modelling Complementarity in Price-Setting
Complementarity in price-setting is introduced by allowing for variable demand elas-
ticities following the work of Kimball (1995). This approach is consistent with mi-
croeconomic evidence suggesting that competitors￿actions play a central role in the
behavior of price adjustments:3 the Kimball demand function makes it more costly
for ￿rms to get their prices out of line with the average price set by other ￿rms than
3Examples include Bills and Klenow (2004), and Blinder (1991, 1994) for the United States.
5the standard Dixit-Stiglitz demand as illustrated by the relative demand and corre-
sponding pro￿t functions plotted in Figure 1.4 This approach is also consistent with
the evidence that ￿rms tend to change their price more in response to a cost increase
than decrease (Peltzman (2000)) as seen by the curvature of the pro￿t function. This
concept has been introduced by Stiglitz (1979), Ball and Romer (1990), and Dotsey
and King (2005), and more recently within the open economy macroeconomic litera-
ture by Bergin and Feenstra (2001), Bouakez (2005), and Gust, Leduc, and Vigfusson
(2006). However, as opposed to the literature where the timing of price adjustment
is ￿xed, state-dependent pricing and variable demand elaticities increases the inter-
action between ￿rms as they opt to keep their price in line with the general level of
product prices: variable demand elasticities makes it desirable for ￿rms to keep their
prices similar to those of others while state-dependent pricing makes it feasible for
them to do so.
2.2.1 Demand Aggregators and Firm￿ s Relative Demand
We follow the approach outlined by Kimball (1995) and consider the following general








￿(d(z)=d)dz = 1 (7)
where d represents a country-speci￿c aggregate demand for each market which is im-
plicitly de￿ned by a demand aggregator ￿ such that an aggregate producer price index
P P holds for each country￿ s domestic and exported markets. In this environment,
each ￿rm produces a di⁄erentiated product such that P (z) identi￿es the price of the
good charged by an individual ￿rm z with corresponding relative demand d(z)=d.
Moreover, our speci￿c aggregator ￿ is an increasing and concave function re￿ ecting
diminishing demand elasticity, and is de￿ned over the parameters ’ and % which












This demand aggregator implicitly de￿nes ￿rm￿ s relative demand as the ratio of ￿rm z
in a country-speci￿c aggregate demand d, and is a function of individual and aggregate
4The open economy macroeconomic literature typically assume that ￿rms face a constant elas-
ticity of demand. This assumption implies that the optimal price-setting rule is a constant markup
over marginal cost. Therefore, cost considerations become central to a ￿rm￿ s price setting decision
leaving little room for interactions between competitors.
5The parameter % determines the elasticity of demand at the average level of product prices while
’ determines the curvature of the demand function. A nice property of this speci￿cation is that
the Dixit and Stiglitz aggregator is a special case represented by ’ = 0. Derivation of the above
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There exists a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms located on the unit
interval and indexed by z in each country. At any date t, a ￿rm is identi￿ed by its
current prices (i.e.: P1;1;t(z) and P1;2;t(z) in Country 1 and P2;2;t(z) and P2;1;t(z) in





cost is denominated in labor hours and drawn from a time-invariant distribution G(￿)
that is common across all country-speci￿c ￿rms. Since the indices z are uncorrelated
over time, and there are no other state variables attached to individual ￿rms, all
country-speci￿c price-adjusting ￿rms simultaneously choose the same optimal price
b P for each market. We restrict ourselves to environments with positive steady-state
in￿ ation rates so that the bene￿t of price adjustment becomes in￿nitely large as the
number of periods for which the price has been ￿xed grows. Given that the support
of the distribution G(￿) is ￿nite, there exist ￿nite fractions of ￿rms sharing a common
price in each country denoted by J1 and J2 and de￿ned as vintages.
2.3.1 Production and Demand
In this environment, labor used for price adjustment is denoted na(z) and labor used
for production is denoted ny(z). The total amount of labor is thus na(z) + ny(z) =
n(z). Technology is linear in labor, and ￿rms are subject to a common country-
speci￿c stochastic total factor productivity a such that production by an individual
￿rm is represented by yt(z) = atn
y
t(z).
7Using (4), aggregate demand d is determined by domestic and exported consump-
tion


























































Equation (12) illustrates that production by an individual ￿rm depends on its price
relative to other domestic ￿rms (PPI), and on country-speci￿c aggregate demand (11)
which is determined by the degree of home bias, the elasticity of substitution between
domestic and imported goods, the PPI to CPI ratios, and aggregate domestic and
foreign consumption.
2.3.2 Pricing Policy
In both state- and time-dependent pricing frameworks, the ￿rm￿ s optimal decision can
be represented using a dynamic programming approach: given the level of technology,
demand (12), the current menu cost of price adjustment ￿(z), the current real prices
pC(z), and the prevailing real wage rate w, individual ￿rms decide whether or not to
adjust their prices with respect to a state vector s. Accordingly, ￿rms in each country
























































































8with the value if the individual ￿rm does (v0t) or does not (vjt) adjust, and real








































































In these functions, ￿t;t+1 = ￿t+1=￿t denotes the ratio of future to current marginal
utility and is the appropriate discount factor for future real pro￿ts,  t represents real
marginal cost which is equal to  t = wt=at, pC represents the domestic and foreign
￿rms￿relative prices, b pC represents the domestic and foreign optimal price chosen by
adjusting ￿rms, and y represents domestic and foreign demand. Both, the optimal
and current real price are relative to domestic CPI which are the appropriate prices
in the ￿rm￿ s decision making.
Equation (13) shows that the ￿rm must weight the current and future bene￿ts
of adjusting its prices versus the status-quo. Firms that decide to adjust set prices
optimally and choose cost-minimizing levels of input. Firms that decide not to adjust
prices take their output as given and simply choose input to minimize cost. In this en-
vironment, the country-speci￿c endogenous adjustment fractions ￿j;t are determined
by the menu cost of the marginal ￿rms being just equal to the value gained such that
￿ (￿j;t) ￿ w(st) = v0;t(st) ￿ vj;t(st): (15)
Notice that the ￿rm￿ s pricing decision considers simultaneous adjustment of do-
mestic and exported prices: ￿rms face a single cost of price adjustment for both the
domestic and exported markets. This cost of price adjustment speci￿cation implies
that individual ￿rm consider the evolution of both markets in choosing the timing and
magnitude of domestic and export price adjustment. This speci￿cation may represent
managerial costs or common costs across markets for the price adjusting ￿rms.6
Finally, the dynamic program (13) implies that the optimal price satis￿es an Euler
equation that involves balancing pricing e⁄ects on current and expected future pro￿ts.
6Their is few research on costs behavior associated with ￿rm￿ s international price adjustment
decisions. It might be the case that these costs are distinct across markets. A natural extension
could study costs behavior in more details and allows ￿rms to have distinct domestic and exported
pricing decisions.
9That is, as part of an optimal plan, price-adjusting ￿rms choose prices that satisfy















































































Iterating the Euler equation (16) forward, the country-speci￿c ￿rm nominal optimal















































































where ￿j;t;t+j represents the probability of non-adjustment from t to t + j, and ￿j;t+j
denotes the elasticity of demand facing the individual ￿rm. Accordingly, the optimal
price is a ￿xed markup over real marginal cost if the demand elasticities, the price
levels, and real marginal cost are expected to be constant over time.
The optimal pricing rules (17) are generalizations of the types derived in open
economy macroeconomic models with exogenous probabilities. They also represent
an open economy version of the closed economy state-dependent pricing rules of Dot-
sey, King, and Wolman (1999), and Dotsey and King (2005). However, in contrast to
10their closed economy counterparts, foreign economic conditions and the nominal ex-
change rate enter the decision of the value maximizing ￿rms and henceforth in￿ uence
the endogenous adjustment probabilities. The pricing rules illustrate that optimal
prices vary with adjustment probabilities, discount factors, demand elasticities, real
marginal costs, domestic PPIs and CPIs, and current and expected future demand
(which includes global consumption, domestic and foreign CPIs, domestic PPIs, and
the nominal exchange rate).
2.4 Monetary Policies
The monetary policy rules are speci￿ed as exogenous money supply rules. More
speci￿cally, the nominal money supply growth follows an autoregressive process in
both countries
￿M1;t = ￿1￿M1;t￿1 + #1￿M2;t + ￿1;t (18)
￿M2;t = ￿2￿M2;t￿1 + #2￿M1;t + ￿2;t
where ￿ describes the coe¢ cients of autocorrelation, # admits for the possibility of
monetary policy comovements, and ￿t are independently and identically distributed
zero-mean disturbances.
2.5 General Equilibrium
In this environment, the aggregate state of the economy at time t is a vector st =
(M1;t;M2;t; ￿1;t;￿2;t) where M represents the exogenous state variables, and ￿ rep-
resents the evolution of producer prices within each country (country￿ s speci￿c vec-
tor of prices and corresponding density distribution of ￿rms across prices). Given
the aggregate state, a general equilibrium for the economy is a collection of se-
quences satisfying a set of equilibrium conditions: a collection of allocations for con-
sumers c1;t;n1;t;b1;t+1 and c2;t;n2;t;b2;t+1, a collection of allocations and price for ￿rms
y1;t(z);n1;t(z);P1;1;t(z);P1;2;t (z) and y2;t(z); n2;t(z);P2;2;t(z);P2;1;t (z), and a collection
of prices P P
1;1;t;P P
1;2;t;P C
1;t;W1;t; D1;t+1 and P P
2;2;t; P P
2;1;t;P C
2;t;W2;t;D2;t+1 such that (i)
consumers maximize their utilities, (ii) ￿rms maximize their values, and (iii) aggre-
gate consistency conditions hold. These aggregate consistency conditions include
market clearing conditions in the goods and labor markets, and consistency for the
time-varying distributions of ￿rms in each country.
112.6 Solution and Benchmark Parameterization
2.6.1 Solution
We use numerical methods to solve the model and study its behavior. First, we com-
pute the steady state equilibrium by imposing trade account balance to the long-run
behavior of the model. The steady-state equilibrium for this economy involves the
lowest values of vintages that generates unconditional adjustment by all ￿rms in each
country. Second, we take a linear approximation of the behavioral equations around
the steady state equilibrium and compute the resulting linear rational expectations
equilibrium using an algorithm developed by King and Watson (1998). The intro-
duction of a Pricing-to-Market environment add an extra distortion associated with
the prevailing rate of in￿ ation experiences in both countries. Unlike a model of in
which producers set prices in domestic currency units, a model like ours implies a
long-run interdependence between countries: trading partner policies or economic
structures has an e⁄ect on domestic real and nominal variables. For example, trading
with countries experiencing higher levels of in￿ ation decreases consumption as more
resources are devoted to price adjustments and not to production of goods.
2.6.2 Benchmark Parameterization
We study the model￿ s implication using a calibrated model that matches the rela-
tive size and degree of home bias shared by the US with an aggregate of developed
economy composed of Japan, Germany, France, and the UK called G4 economy. We
use parameter values generally accepted in the macroeconomic and open economy
literatures. A time period of the model corresponds to a quarter of a year. The
subjective discount factors ￿ imply annual real rate of returns of 4.1 percent. We
choose preference parameter values that produce a low elasticity of marginal cost
with respect to real output by setting the parameters governing the degrees of risk
aversion ￿ to 0.25 and the parameters governing the elasticities of labor supply ￿ to
0.05. Those parameters generate elasticities of marginal cost of approximately 0.3.7
Agents work 20 percent of their time endowment. Country 1 is characterized by a
degree of home bias of 3.75 percent and represent half of the world￿ s GDP. The former
correspond to the average share of US exports to GDP over the sample while the later
correspond to the ratio of US to G4 GDPs. We set the elasticities of substitution
between domestic and imported consumption goods ￿ to unity. Bergin (2004) o⁄ers
empirical evidence from macro-level data which supports this common practice in
the literature. The two countries share similar levels of productivity a. Finally, we
set steady-state money growth rates ￿ to 0.01 which correspond to growth rates of 4
percent on an annual basis, and the autocorrelations of the money growth processes
￿ to 0.5.
7Given that the households e¢ ciency condition is wt = c￿
t n￿, and that consumption and labor
are approximately equal to output, the elasticities of marginal cost are approximately equal to ￿+￿.
122.6.3 Demand Structure and Price Distributions
The variable elasticity demand curves are parametrized by choosing values of % so
that demand curves have elasticities of 10 at d(z)=d = 1. Restricting ’ to take values
of 1.02 implies that a 1 percent increase in price decreases demand by 13 percent,
which is somewhere between the response assumed Kimball (1995), and Bergin and
Feenstra (2001).
The remaining parameters involve the distributions of adjustment costs which,
alongside the demand functions, determine the timing and distributions of prices.
Table 2 displays the steady-state fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms as well as the
population densities associated with the parametrized model for both countries.8
The chosen adjustment costs structure leads to a steady-state hazard function that
is roughly quadratic in the log relative price deviation as suggested by Caballero
and Engle (1993). It implies an average age of prices of less then 2.72 quarters,
and an expected price duration of 4 quarters under the steady-state in￿ ation rate
of 4 percent. Together, the demand and adjustment costs speci￿cations provide a
good approximation of the main features governing the pattern of price adjustments
and pricing policies observed in empirical studies on pricing behavior in developed
economies.
3 Understanding the Model and its Implications
We analyze the model￿ s responses to a monetary policy shock and contrast these
responses with those from a time-dependent variant more closely related to standard
open economy macroeconomic works. We subject Country 1 to a monetary policy
shock in which the money stock increases by 1 percent on impact with a long-run
response approaching 2 percent above its initial level. Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2002) and Christiano, Eichembaum, and Evans (2005) support this pattern of money
growth as a good approximation to a US interest rate rule.
3.1 Open Economy Business Cycle Statistics
First, we compared the ￿ltered moments generated by the model to the ￿ltered mo-
ments generated by the data. The ￿lter used is the approximate business cycle band-
pass ￿lter suggested by Baxter and King (1999). When comparing the moments, we
implicitly assumed that monetary disturbances are the only exogenous shocks in the
model. Table 3 displays the correlations that occur at business-cycle frequencies for
the US and a aggregate of developed economy composed of Japan, Germany, France,
8Choice of the adjustment costs parameters are detailed in Appendix B.
13and the UK called G4 economy and our calibrated model that matches the relative
size and degree of home bias shared by those economies. The US data are from the
BEA, and the Japanese, German, French, and British data are from OECD Economic
Outlook. The quarterly data cover the period 1974Q1 to 2005Q4 and when neces-
sary are expressed in per capita 2000 US dollars at purchasing-power-parity. Prior
research summarized by Baxter (1995) shown that open economy ￿ uctuations are
similar among developed economies. The terms of trade statistics are calculated as
the ratio of imports to exports prices.9
In the data, output, consumption, exports, imports, and in￿ ation tend to be
strongly procyclical. The trade balance is countercyclical with respect to output
and consumption. As for international prices, the nominal exchange rate is acyclical
relative to output but procyclical relative to the trade balance, the terms of trade, and
in￿ ation while the terms of trade is countercyclical relative to output but procyclical
relative to the trade balance. In terms of cross-country correlation, we observed a
higher cross-country output correlation relative to consumption correlation. Finally,
CPI in￿ ation across countries are highly correlated.
Altogether, our simple state-dependent pricing model does better than its time-
dependent variant in replicating the moments of interest: the within- and cross-
country correlations are fairly closed to the data in all but the ones related to the
nominal exchange rate. The state-dependent model generates the procyclicality of
imports and exports and the countercyclicality of the trade balance.10 The state-
dependent model also replicates the sign and the magnitude of the correlation between
the trade balance and the terms of trade, as well as the sign and magnitude of the
cross-correlation of output and consumption.
3.2 Open Economy Business Cycle Fluctuations
Figures 2 to 6 illustrate the impulse response of microeconomic and macroeconomic
aggregates over horizons of 16 quarters. The solid lines represent the state-dependent
version of the model, while the dashed lines represent its time-dependent counterpart.
The time-dependent counterpart is calibrated so that the fractions of price-adjusting
￿rms are held ￿xed at steady-state values. To get a better understanding of the
mechanism through which money a⁄ects international economic activity, we start by
exploring the reaction of individual ￿rms to the monetary policy shock and then turn
to the aggregate implications.
9The data sources and aggregation are described in Appendix A.
10Note that the state-depedent model replicates the relatively high correlation between output
and imports versus output and exports.
143.2.1 Firms￿Reactions to a Monetary Shock
The top row of Figure 2 displays ￿rms￿reactions while the bottom rows displays the
domestic and exported optimal prices chosen by the price-adjusting ￿rms. Figure 3
displays the associated producer and consumer price indices. A novel feature of the
state-dependent pricing open economy model is the evolving distribution of price-
adjusting ￿rms across countries. In Country 1, rising product demand and rising
aggregate prices generated by the domestic monetary expansion enforce the extent
of adjustment of individual ￿rms, and consequently result into increasing deviations
in fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms. Notice that the introduction of variable demand
elasticities generates smooth movements in adjusting fractions as ￿rms bunch their
actions: (i) initially, the monetary shock translates very little to individual and aggre-
gate prices because ￿rms are not willing to price di⁄erently from one another, (ii) then
rising domestic aggregate prices enforce the extent of adjustment of individual ￿rms
and consequently result into increasing deviations in fractions of price-adjusting ￿rms,
and ￿nally (iii) the fractions of price adjusting ￿rms returns to its long-run value as
decreased demand o⁄set higher aggregate prices.
Associated with movements in adjusting fraction are the optimal domestic and
exported prices charged by price-adjusting ￿rms. The behavior of the optimal price
movements under the time-dependent pricing environment is in sharp contrast with
the behavior of optimal prices under the state-dependent pricing environment. Un-
der the time-dependent pricing environment, the domestic optimal price jumps be-
fore converging to its new long-run value while the exported optimal price remains at
steady-state value. The former is the front-loading aspect common to time-dependent
pricing models. The later is an outcome of time-dependent pricing and market seg-
mentation: time-dependent pricing models imply that the distributions of ￿rms over
prices remain constant through time while market segmentation breaks the link be-
tween domestic and foreign demand. Under the state-dependent pricing environment,
the domestic optimal price reacts very little on impact. On the one hand, the for-
ward looking price-setting ￿rm would prefer to raise its price in light of the monetary
policy shock. On the other hand, the ￿rm knows that it has the possibility to reset
its prices at any time in the future, and would rather do so than lose market share
by pricing high relative to its competitors. In contrast, the exported optimal price
oscillates arround the steady-state. On impact, the nominal exchange rate deprecia-
tion generated by the domestic monetary expansion increases domestic ￿rms markup
on exported goods and induce ￿rms to compete in the export market: since ￿rms
prices are roughly set as a markup over marginal cost, ￿rms that reoptimize prices
choose a lower prices in the export market. Thereafter, movements in the nominal ex-
change rate coupled with demand and cost movements generate markup ￿ uctuations
on exported goods and ultimately leads to ￿ uctuation on exported optimal prices.
In Country 2, rising exported product demand and rising domestic competition
15induces ￿rms to reset their domestic and exported optimal prices. This results into
a positive deviation in the fraction of price-adjusting ￿rms and an incease in do-
mestic and exported optimal prices. Once again, the behavior of the optimal price
movements under the time-dependent pricing environment is very di⁄erent from the
behavior of optimal prices under the state-dependent pricing environment. Under the
time-dependent pricing environment, the domestic optimal price remains at steady-
state value while the exported optimal price increases to follow Country￿ s 1 CPI and
to o⁄set nominal exchange rate movements. Under the state-dependent pricing en-
vironment, the domestic optimal price decreases slightly to compete against lower
imported good prices before surging in positive territory as demand for domestic
good increases. At the same time, the exported optimal price increases to follow the
Country￿ s 1 CPI and to o⁄set nominal exchange rate movements.
3.2.2 Aggregate Implications of a Monetary Shock
Price Indices We now turn to the aggregate implications of our model. As dis-
played in Figure 3, the two environments have very di⁄erent implications for the
dynamics of prices faced by consumers. Under the time-dependent model, consumers
in Country 1 see raising movements in prices while consumers in Country 2 see no
movements in prices as the optimal prices as well as the distributions of ￿rms over
prices remain constant. In contrast, the distributions of prices over ￿rms evolve un-
der the state-dependent pricing model and consequently altered the prices faced by
consumers in both countries.
Output, Consumption, and In￿ ation Dynamics Output and consumption re-
sponses are displayed in the top rows of Figure 4. Under the time-dependent model,
Country 1￿ s output and consumption respond positively after the monetary shock.
In Country 2, output respond positively has the economy supplies more goods to
Country 1 while consumption doesn￿ t respond has prices faced by consumer remain
constant. As in time-dependent pricing model, Country 1￿ s output and consump-
tion respond positively after the monetary shock under the state-dependent pricing
model. However, while Country 2￿ s output respond positively, its consumption con-
tracts as the consumer price index moves above its steady-state value. Although the
cross-correlation of output and consumption are in line with data, the models fail to
generate a consumption boom abroad following a monetary shock as suggested by
the empirical work of Faust and Rogers (2003), Kim (2001), and Sims (1992).
The bottom row of Figure 4 displays CPI in￿ ation dynamics. Under the time-
dependent model, CPI in￿ ation responds positively in Country 1 while its response
is nil in Country 2. In contrast, an important strength of the state-dependent model
is its ability to generate delayed responses in CPI in￿ ations in both countries: CPI
16in￿ ation peaks 5 quarters after the monetary shock in Country 1 and 8 quarters after
the monetary shock in Country 2.
Nominal Exchange Rate, Terms of Trade, and Trade Dynamics Figure 5
displays nominal and real exchange rates, as well as the trade balance and the terms
of trade for Country 1. The monetary shock induces a signi￿cant and persistent
depreciation in the nominal exchange rate, and displays the delayed overshooting
e⁄ect stressed by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995) empirical study on the e⁄ects of US
monetary policy shocks on exchange rates. Most of the short-term responses of the
nominal exchange rate are in the real exchange rate: these are relative price changes
that a⁄ect demand composition. At longer horizons, the nominal exchange rate is
mainly a⁄ected by the domestic price level in a close to neutral manner.11
A central idea in the Keynesian approach to international macroeconomics is the
expenditure-switching e⁄ect of nominal exchange rate changes: a country with a
depreciating currency will experience a fall in the relative price of its exports and
a resulting redirection of world expenditure in favor of its products. The results
are clearly at odd with this proposition. Under the time-dependent model, their is
no movements in domestic exports since foreign agents do not perceived any price
changes. Under the state-dependent pricing model, exports quickly moves in negative
territories as domestic ￿rms raise their foreign prices. On the imports side, the increase
in income mixed with an overvalued exchange rate raises the demand for imports in
the short-run. The behavior of exports and imports translate into a trade balance
de￿cit under both time- and state-dependent models.
Alternatively, one can look at the terms of trade de￿ned as the ratio of home-
currency price paid for goods imported from abroad over the home-currency price
received on home goods exported abroad. Under traditional Keynesian models, the
terms of trade raises following a domestic currency depreciation as the home-currency
price paid for good imported increases. We say that the terms of trade are favorable
since domestic goods are now cheaper on the world market. Obstfeld and Rogo⁄
(2000) o⁄ers empirical evidence of a positive comovements between the nominal ex-
change rate and the terms of trade. However, in the current PTM environment, the
opposite arises: domestic and imported goods prices move in tandem while the do-
mestic currency depreciates. Hence, a currency depreciation causes a worsening of
the terms of trade. Therefore, although the model generates a positive correlation
between the trade balance and the terms of trade, terms of trade movements con-
tradict Obstfeld and Rogo⁄ conjecture. Moreover, in contrast to its time-dependent
11Figure 5 aknowledges the model￿ s failure to generate real and nominal exchange rate movements
that are highly correlated as in the data. However, most of the correlation between real and nominal
exchange rates often found in the open economy macroeconomic literature results from simultaneous
front-loading aspects of prices and consumption common to time-dependent pricing models.
17variant, the state-dependent model displays (i) greater variations in the terms of trade
because of the greater variability in consumer prices, and (ii) an improvement in the
terms of trade after 3 years as the price paid for imported goods is above the price
received for exported goods.
From the perspective of Country 2, real economic activity and trade dynamics are
best understood by undertaking decompositions of output and consumption into their
domestic and foreign components as illustrated in Figure 6. In the time-dependent
model, the expansion of output is solely generated by the increase in exports as do-
mestic consumption remains at steady-state value. In the state-dependent model,
output is in￿ uenced by a domestic and exported components: the exported compo-
nent lunches the output boom while the domestic component dampens it after a few
quarters as domestic consumption falls. Similarly, consumption is in￿ uenced by a
domestic and imported components. An interesting implication is that the bulk of
the deviation in consumption comes from falling domestic demand as the monetary
shock in￿ uences the foreign price distribution. This implies that the foreign econ-
omy is not isolated from Country 1￿ s actions and consequently suggests a role for the
foreign monetary authority in a PTM environment.
4 Conclusion
This paper develops an open economy state-dependent pricing that embodies a PTM
environment. Relative to its time-dependent variants, our state-dependent pricing
model implies that domestic monetary shocks spill over to foreign consumption as
movements in the distributions of price-setters in￿ uence foreign aggregate prices.
This result contradicts the current wisdom and has important implications for the
design of international monetary policy in a PTM environment.
Endogenizing the timing of ￿rm￿ s response is clearly a feature that bring the cur-
rent open economy macroeconomic models closer to reality. An interesting avenue
of research will look at the foreign monetary authority responses to change the dis-
tribution of prices and expected path of expenditure and in￿ ation. For example,
endogenizing monetary policy could potentially eradicate the puzzling nature of for-
eign expenditure by easing foreign monetary policy following a domestic monetary
shock. This is clearly something to investigate in future research.
184.1 Appendix A: Data
Source: BEA
￿ Quarterly real gross domestic product
￿ Quarterly real personal consumption expenditure
￿ Quarterly personal consumption expenditure price de￿ ator
￿ Quarterly exports price index
￿ Quarterly imports price index
￿ Quarterly working-age population
￿ Monthly e⁄ective Federal Funds rate
￿ Monthly M1 money stock
￿ Monthly Trade Weighted exchange rate index - Major Currencies
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from Japan
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from Germany
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from United Kingdom
￿ Monthly exports/imports to/from France
Source: OECD Economic Outlook
￿ Quarterly nominal gross domestic product for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Quarterly nominal private ￿nal consumption expenditure for Japan, Germany, France,
and the UK.
￿ Quarterly gross domestic product de￿ ator for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Quarterly private ￿nal consumption expenditure de￿ ator for Japan, Germany, France,
and the UK.
￿ Quarterly Working-age population for Japan, Germany, France, and the UK.
￿ Annual Purchasing Power Parity in US dollars for Japan, Germany, France, and the
UK.
G4 aggregates are built using working-age population weights and translated in
2000 US dollars using the year 2000 PPP values.
194.2 Appendix B: Demand Aggregators








￿(d(z)=d)dz = 1 (B.1)
The country-speci￿c aggregate demands d for goods are implicitly de￿ned by a
demand aggregator ￿ such that an aggregate producer price index P P holds for each
country. The ￿rst order condition of the expenditure minimization problem yields:







where Z is the Lagrange multiplier on the constraint. Consequently, the ￿rst order












Given the demand curves and the multipliers, the aggregate producer price indices









dz = 1 (B.4)
4.3 Appendix C: Adjustment Costs Structure
We adopt the costs structure used in Dotsey and King (2005). The adjustment
costs are stochastic and idiosyncratic across ￿rms, and are governed by country-
speci￿c cumulative distribution functions (CDF) G(x) on the interval 0 ￿ x ￿ B and
corresponding density functions g (x). Under the adjustment rules, a country-speci￿c
￿rm￿ s probability of adjustment is:











Hence, the fraction of price-adjusting ￿rms in each vintage is determined by a
marginal ￿rm being indi⁄erent to price adjustment.
The functional form used to derived the adjustment costs functions is the arctan-
gent. This functional form is a monotonically increasing function that maps the real
20line into the interval (￿￿;￿) in di⁄erent shapes. In this paper, we use the an interval
of the arctangent [x;x] and assume that
x(￿) = ￿ ￿ (x ￿ x) + x (C.3)
where ￿ is restricted to the range 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1. Finally, we assume that the inverse
of the CDF takes the form
￿ (￿) = K1s(x) + K2 (C.4)
The inverse CDF takes on a zero value at ￿ = 0 and a value of B at ￿ = 1:
0 = K1s(x) + K2 (C.5)
B = K1s(x) + K2







The results reported in the paper use value of B = 0:015 and x 2 [0;4]. Since
the steady-state fractions of households￿times devoted to production are n = 0:2,
setting B = 0:015 involves that the maximum adjustment costs are 7.5 percent of
production times in the hypothetical economy. This also implies that the resources
devoted to price adjustments correspond roughly to 0.8 percent of ￿rm￿ s revenues
with a maximum adjustment cost of 8.2 percent of revenues.
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24Parameter values governing: Country 1 Country 2
Preferences
￿ Discount rate 0.99 0.99
￿ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.25 0.25
￿ Elasticity of labor supply 0.05 0.05
n Fraction of time working 0.20 0.20
Demands
% Demand curvature 1.02 1.02
￿ Elasticity of demand at 1 10 10
Countries
s Country￿ s relative size 0.50 0.50
￿ Degree of home bias 0.0375 0.0.75
￿ Elasticity of substitution - Country 1 1
Productivity
a Total factor productivity 1 1
Monetary policies
￿ Steady-state money growth rate 0.01 0.01
￿ Money growth autocorrelation 0.50 0.50
Table 1: Benchmark parameters
25Quarter(s) since last adjustment
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
￿j Probability of adjustment ￿ 0.04 0.11 0.22 0.39 0.67 1
!j Population density 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.10 0.03 ￿
Table 2: Stationary distributions of ￿rms across countries




















Figure 1: Dixit-Stiglitz and Kimball demand and pro￿t functions























































































































































































































Figure 3: Price indices




















































































































Figure 4: Output, consumption, and CPI in￿ ation






























































































































Figure 5: Exchange rate and trade
















































































Figure 6: Output and consumption components in Country 2
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